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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

vs.

:
Case No. 20060363-CA

CAESAR RODRIGUEZ,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a finding of guilty of Aggravated Assault, a seconddegree felony in violation of U.C.A.§76-5-103.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF
REVIEW
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN FAILING TO GRANT
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO REMAND THE CASE TO
JUVENILE COURT?
PRESERVATION: This issue was properly preserved for appeal by the
timely filing of a motion to remand case to the juvenile court, which was
denied. (R.)
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Since the facts of the case were not in
dispute, the Appellate Court reviews the trial courts legal conclusions non1

deferentially for correctness. State v. Singleton 2005 UT App 464, ^J6, 128 P.3d
28, and State v. D^/raT? 2005 UT App 409 IflO, 131 P.3d 246.
CONSTITUTIONAL PRO VISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
United States Constitution
Eighth Amendment - Further Guarantees in Criminal Cases
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and
unusual punishments inflicted.
Fourteenth Amendment - Rights Guaranteed Privileges and Immunities of
Citizenship, Due Process and Equal Protection Fourteenth
Amendment - Rights Guaranteed Privileges and Immunities of
Citizenship, Due Process and Equal Protection
Section. 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to
the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.
Section. 2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States
according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons
in each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any
election for the choice of electors for President and Vice President of the
United States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial officers
of a State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the
male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of
the United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion,
or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the
proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole
number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State.
Section. 3. No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or
elector of President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military,
under the United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an
2

oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United Stales, or as a
member of any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any
State, to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in
insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the
enemies thereof But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House,
remove such disability.
Section. 4. The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by
law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services
in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the
United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred
in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any claim for the
loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations and claims
shall be held illegal and void.
Section. 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of this article.

Utah State Constitution
Article I, Section 9. Excessive bail and fines — Cruel punishments.
Excessive bail shall not be required; excessive fines shall not be imposed;
nor shall cruel and unusual punishments be inflicted. Persons arrested or
imprisoned shall not be treated with unnecessary rigor.
Article I, Section 14. Unreasonable searches forbidden -- Issuance of
warrant.
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation,
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be
seized.
Article I, Section 24. Uniform operation of laws.
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation.

UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
§78-3a-603. Certification hearings—Juvenile court to hold preliminary
hearing—Factors considered by juvenile court for waiver of jurisdiction to
district court
(1) If a criminal information filed in accordance with Subsection 78-3a502(3) alleges the commission of an act which would constitute a felony if
committed by an adult, the juvenile court shall conduct a preliminary hearing.
(2) At the preliminary hearing the state shall have the burden of going
forward with its case and the burden of establishing:
(a) probable cause to believe that a crime was committed and that the
defendant committed it; and
(b) by a preponderance of the evidence, that it would be contrary to the best
interests of the minor or of the public for the juvenile court to retain
jurisdiction.
(3) In considering whether or not it would be contrary to the best interests of
the minor or of the public for the juvenile court to retain jurisdiction, the
juvenile court shall consider, and may base its decision on, the finding of one
or more of the following factors:
(a) the seriousness of the offense and whether the protection of the
community requires isolation of the minor beyond that afforded by juvenile
facilities;
(b) whether the alleged offense was committed by the minor in concert with
two or more persons under circumstances which would subject the minor to
enhanced penalties under Section 76-3-203.1 were he an adult;
(c) whether the alleged offense was committed in an aggressive, violent,
premeditated, or willful manner;
(d) whether the alleged offense was against persons or property, greater
weight being given to offenses against persons, except as provided in
Section 76-8-418;
(e) the maturity of the minor as determined by considerations of his home,
environment, emotional attitude, and pattern of living;
(f) the record and previous history of the minor;
4

(g) the likelihood of rehabilitation of the minor by use of facilities available
to the juvenile court;
(h) the desirability of trial and disposition of the entire offense in one court
when the minor's associates in the alleged offense are adults who will be
charged with a crime in the district court;
(i) whether the minor used a firearm in the commission of an offense; and
(j) whether the minor possessed a dangerous weapon on or about school
premises as provided in Section 76-10-505.5.
(4) The amount of weight to be given to each of the factors listed in
Subsection (3) is discretionary with the court.
(5)(a) Written reports and other materials relating to the minor's mental,
physical, educational, and social history may be considered by the court.
(b) If requested by the minor, the minor's parent, guardian, or other
interested party, the court shall require the person or agency preparing the
report and other material to appear and be subject to both direct and crossexamination.
(6) At the conclusion of the state's case, the minor may testify under oath, call
witnesses, cross-examine adverse witnesses, and present evidence on the
factors required by Subsection (3).
(7) If the court finds the state has met its burden under Subsection (2), the
court may enter an order:
(a) certifying that finding; and
(b) directing that the minor be held for criminal proceedings in the district
court.
(8) If an indictment is returned by a grand jury, the preliminary examination
held by the juvenile court need not include a finding of probable cause, but the
juvenile court shall proceed in accordance with this section regarding the
additional consideration referred to in Subsection (2)(b).
(9) The provisions of Section 78-3a-116, Section 78-3a-913, and other
provisions relating to proceedings in juvenile cases are applicable to the
hearing held under this section to the extent they are pertinent.
5

(10) A minor who has been directed to be held for criminal proceedings in the
district court is not entitled to a preliminary examination in the district court.
(11) A minor who has been certified for trial in the district court shall have the
same right to bail as any other criminal defendant and shall be advised of that
right by the juvenile court judge. The juvenile court shall set initial bail in
accordance with Title 77, Chapter 20, Bail.
(12) When a minor has been certified to the district court under this section or
when a criminal information or indictment is filed in a court of competent
jurisdiction before a committing magistrate charging the minor with an offense
described in Section 78-3a-602, the jurisdiction of the Division of Juvenile
Justice Services and the jurisdiction of the juvenile court over the minor is
terminated regarding that offense, any other offenses arising from the same
criminal episode, and any subsequent misdemeanors or felonies charged
against him, except as provided in Subsection (14).
(13) If a minor enters a plea to, or is found guilty of any of the charges filed or
on any other offense arising out of the same criminal episode, the district court
retains jurisdiction over the minor for all purposes, including sentencing.
(14) The juvenile court under Section 78-3a-104 and the Division of Juvenile
Justice Services regain jurisdiction and any authority previously exercised over
the minor when there is an acquittal, a finding of not guilty, or dismissal of all
charges in the district court.

76-5-103. Aggravated assault.
(1) A person commits aggravated assault if he commits assault as defined in
Section 76-5-102 and he:
(a) intentionally causes serious bodily injury to another; or
(b) under circumstances not amounting to a violation of Subsection (l)(a),
uses a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601 or other means or
force likely to produce death or serious bodily injury.
(2) A violation of Subsection (l)(a) is a second degree felony.
(3) A violation of Subsection (1 )(b) is a third degree felony

6

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Defendant was originally brought before the juvenile court to
answer charges of Attempted Murder, a first-degree felony; possession of a
dangerous weapon by a restricted person, a third-degree felony; aggravated
assault, a second -degree felony; and riot, a third-degree felony. The case was
heard in the juvenile court on a certification hearing on April 28, 2005, before
the Honorable L. Kent Bachman, judge in the juvenile court. An order
certifying the defendant to district court was filed by the juvenile court on June
1, 2005, and the Defendant was charged by information the next day, June 2,
2005. No appeal of that order certifying the juvenile to district court was ever
filed.
On November 10, 2005, the Defendant's attorney Martin Gravis filed a
motion to remand the case back to juvenile court on the grounds that the
defendant's rights under the 8th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and
Article I, Section 9 and 14 of the Utah Constitution had been violated.
Arguments were heard on that motion on January 12, 2006, before the
Honorable Michael D. Lyon, and on Januaiy 20, 2005, the court issued a ruling
denying the defendant's motion.
On February 2, 2006, the Defendant entered a plea of guilty to the
Aggravated Assault charge reserving the right to appeal the trial courts ruling
7

on the motion to remand pursuant to State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah Ct. App.
1988). The remaining charges were dismissed. On March 16, 2006.

The

Defendant was sentenced to an indeterminate term of one to fifteen years in the
Utah State Prison. The Judgment, Sentence and Commitment was filed on
April 5, 2006. The prison term was commenced that day.
The Defendant timely filed his notice of appeal on April 18, 2006.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Since the facts of the case are undisputed by virtue of a guilty plea, the
only relevant facts of the case concern the procedural issues regarding the
certification and motion to remand. For background purposes, the brief facts of
the crime are as follows: At the time of the offense the Defendant was 15 years
old, and was accused of stabbing another individual in the chest during a fight.
The Defendant was arrested for this offense, and taken to the juvenile court
where a certification hearing was held on April 28, 2005. The juvenile court,
on June 1, 2005, ordered that the Defendant should be certified as an adult to
stand trial in District Court. No appeal was taken of that order. Some five
months after the Defendant had been certified to the district court, on
November 10, 2005, the Defendant's attorney Martin Gravis filed a motion to
remand the case back to juvenile court on the grounds that the Defendant's
rights under the 8th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Article I, Section
8

9 and 14 of the Utah Constitution had been violated. Mr. Gravis argued that the
recent Supreme Court decision of Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005)
prohibited the prosecution of a juvenile in district or adult court. Arguments
were heard on that motion on January 12, 2006, before the Honorable Michael
D. Lyon; and on January 20, 2005, the court issued a ruling denying the
Defendant's motion.
On February 2, 2006, the Defendant entered a plea of guilty to the
aggravated assault charges reserving the right to appeal the trial courts ruling
on the motion to remand pursuant to State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah Ct. App.
1988)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The determinative issue of the Defendant on appeal is whether the trial
court improperly denied the Defendant's motion to remand the case back to the
juvenile court. Two issues arise in this determination. First, is the issue
properly before this court since the juvenile court made the certification ruling
on June 1, 2005, to which no appeal was taken? Since the motion to remand
was brought in the district court and the current appeal is taken from the ruling
on that motion, this Court lacks jurisdiction to rule on this issue.
The second issue to be reviewed is whether the

Defendant's

constitutional rights under the 8th and 14th Amendments to the U.S.
9

Constitution and Article I, Sections 9 and 24 of the Utah State Constitution
were violated by the certification of the juvenile. The case that the Defendant's
attorney relied on in support of this position was Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S.
551 (2005). The problem with that reliance is the fact that Roper v. Simmons
does not stand for the proposition that the adult court system does not have
jurisdiction over any juvenile offender. In fact, the adult court in that case
incarcerated the defendant for a term in prison for life without the possibility of
parole. The only issue decided by the Court in Roper v. Simmons was to
declare the death penalty unconstitutional when applied to juveniles.
The fact that appellant counsel may disagrees with the certification of
this juvenile into the adult system, counsel must aclmowledge the lack of
standing to oppose this certification, as well as concede the constitutionality of
the general certification procedure under State v. Gulbransen, 2005 UT 7 *|20
106 P.3d 734, and In re Clatterbuck, 700 P.2d 1076, 1079 (Utah 1985).
Furthermore, appellant counsel disagrees with Attorney Gravis that Roper v.
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) stands for the proposition that adult courts do
not have jurisdiction over certified juvenile offenders.
Based upon all these factors, Defense counsel has been unable to find
any non-frivolous issues to appeal. For this reason, this brief is being filed in
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accordance with the guidelines set forth in Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738
(1967), and State v. Clayton, 639 P.2d (Utah 1981).

ARGUMENT
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN FAILING TO GRANT
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO REMAND THE CASE TO
JUVENILE COURT?
The initial determination that must be addressed is the jurisdiction of this
Court to even hear and decide the issues raised in the Defendant's motion to
remand to juvenile court. In the case of Manning v. State, 2004 UT App 87, f
9, 89 P.3d 196, this Court stated:
The Utah Constitution provides that "[i]n criminal prosecutions
the accused shall have the right to ... appeal in all cases." Utah
Const. Art. I, §12. The Utah Supreme Court has stated that "the
right of appeal [is] essential to a fair criminal proceeding" and it
cannot be "lightly forfeited." State v. Tuttle, 713 P.2d 703, 704
(Utah 1985). However, appeals must be filed "within 30 days
after the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed from."
Utah R.App. P. 4(a). It is well established that "[i]f an appeal is
not timely filed, this court lacks jurisdiction to hear the appeal."
Serrato v. Utah Transit Auth, 2000 UT App 299^ 7, 13 P.3d
616, cert denied, 21 P.3d 218 (Utah 2001). The Utah Supreme
Court has warned that extraordinary writs "must not" be used to
"make a mockery of the time limits for appeal, undermine the
finality of criminal judgments, and promote the indefensible
merry-go-round of collateral attack."
See also Gardner v. Holden, 888 P.2d 608, 613 (Utah 1994) where the Court
held:
11

Issues that could and should have been raised on direct appeal,
but were not, may not properly be raised in a habeas corpus
proceeding absent unusual circumstances. Fernandez v. Cook,
783 P.2d 547, 549 (Utah 1989); Codianna, 660 P.2d at 1104. The
unusual circumstances test requires a showing of uan obvious
injustice or a substantial and prejudicial denial of a constitutional
right."
While the attack to the constitutionality of the certification proceeding in the
case at bar was not attempted by an extraordinary writ, the same principle
would apply to the filing of a motion to remand. The only allowable review
under these circumstances would be if a "substantial and prejudicial denial of a
constitutional right". {Gardner v. Holden)
In the case of State v. Merrill, 2005 UT 34,^j 17 114 P.3d 585, the Utah
Supreme Court held that the late filing of a motion to withdraw a plea resulted
in the Court losing jurisdiction to address any subsequent issues on appeal.
The Court further refused to address a constitutional claim since it had not
risen to the level of plain error by the trial court. See also State v. Hamilton,
2003 UT 22, \ 25 70 P.3d 111 where the Court held: "With rare exception,
when a court with proper jurisdiction enters a final judgment, including a
default judgment, that judgment can only be attacked on direct appeal."
Even if the Defendant were able to get over the fact that the juvenile
untimely filed the appeal by failing to attack the juvenile courts decision on
certification rather than raising the issue in the district court by motion, the
12

case law would not support an attack to the constitutionality of this
certification.
Mr. Gravis argued that the recent Supreme Court decision of Roper v.
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) prohibited the prosecution of a juvenile in
district or adult court. He reasoned that if according to the Court in Roper, a
juvenile is too immature to be categorized as a "worst offender" and if society
had evolved to the point that it would be cruel and unusual to execute a
juvenile, that it would naturally follow that "it is cruel and unusual punishment
to transfer any juvenile case to the district court". (See Def. Memo page 6)
The major flaw in this argument is that the Court in Roper v. Simmons
affirmed the Missouri Supreme Courts decision vacating the death penalty and
"resentencing] him to "life imprisonment without eligibility for probation,
parole, or release except by act of the Governor." (Id at 560)
Utah Appellate Courts have held that a juvenile has no right to be treated
as a juvenile delinquent. Although in the case of State v. Mohi, 901 P.2d 991,
(Utah 1995) the Court declared the direct filing of juveniles in the adult court
pursuant to former U.C.A. §78-3a-25 unconstitutional, the language in that
case indicates that the constitutional concern is the "undirected discretion to
choose where to file charges", and not that a juvenile may be transferred to the
adult court system. See State v. Gulbransen, 2005 UT 7 TJ20 106 P.3d 734,
13

where the Court acknowledged the jurisdiction of the district court to sentence
a juvenile that had been transferred pursuant to a certification proceeding.
In the case of In re Clatterbuck, 700 P.2d 1076, 1079 (Utah 1985), the
court held that a certification by the juvenile court to the district court did not
violate due process claims as follows:
Contrary to defendant's first contention, the statute
explicitly provides a substantive standard for certification: the
juvenile court must find that continued retention of jurisdiction
would be "contrary to the best interests of the child or of the
public." This language adequately spells out the parameters
within which the juvenile court must exercise its discretion and
does not deny defendant due process.
Although that case was decided under prior law, the recodification of the
certification procedures under §78-3a-603 are similar in nature and would be
treated identically for purposes of this case.
The only issue the Defendant wanted appealed was his prison sentence.
For these reasons, counsel respectfully requests pennission to withdraw from
further representation of the Defendant.
Counsel has complied with the requirements set forth in Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and State v. Clayton, 639 P.2d 168 (Utah
1981). Defendant was been mailed a copy of this brief more than thirty days
ago and has not responded to it.

14

CONCLUSION
Counsel is unable to find any non-frivolous issues to appeal. For this
reason, counsel respectfully requests this Court to release him as appellate
counsel.
DATED this £- "3ay of October 2(1)6.
RANDALL W. RICHARDS
Attorney for Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that I mailed two copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant to
Mark Shurtleff, Attorney General, Attorney fortfih Plaintiff, L6Q-East 300
South, 6th Floor. P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake* City,/Utah 84 J4 4-0181), gps^age
prepaid this /#§ay of
Y[MJ^M^^ot,.\

^NDALL W. RICHARDS
Attorney at Law

15

ADDENDUM A

16

SECOND DISTRICT COURT - OGDEN COURT
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
APP SENTENCING
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT
- ^

vs .

Case No: 051902675 FS

CAESAR RAMON RODRIGUEZ,
Defendant.

Judge:
Date:

MICHAEL D. LYON
March 16, 2006

PRESENT
Clerk:
shannone
Prosecutor: WILLIAM DAINES
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): MAPvTIN GRAVIS, PDA
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: July 7, 1989
Video
Tape Number:
L0316 06
Tape Count: 2:04

CHARGES
3. AGGRAVATED ASSAULT - 2nd Degree Felony
Plea: Guilty
- Disposition: 02/02/2006 Guilty
HEARING
This is time set for sentencing. The defendant is present in
custody and represented by Martin Gravis.
Defense counsel opposes the recommendation for prison made by
Adult Probation and Parole and requests that the defendant undergo
a diagnostic evaluation at the Utah State Prison.
The defendant addresses the Court.
The State agreed to recommend a diagnostic commitment.
The Court informs counsel that it is not bound by the plea
agreement. Counsel agrees.
Defense counsel argues that the defendant is only 16 years of age
and has been in custody of the Weber County Jail for one year.
Based on the circumstances of the crime, the defendant's previous
criminal record, and this being a serious crime of violence, the

Case No: 051902675
Date :
Mar 16, 2006
Court finds that a commitment to the Utah State Prison is
appropriate.
The Court further finds that since the defendant was AWOL from a
juvenile detention center at the time the crime was committed, that
the defendant is not amenable to probation in a less-restrictive
setting.
SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of AGGRAVATED ASSAULT a 2nd
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah
State Prison.
To the WEBER County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the
defendant will be confined.

Credit is granted for time served.
The defendant shall be ordered to pay restitution as determined
following a restitution hearing as a condition of parole.
Dated this

W

day of

Aft*

MICHAE^Q. LYON
District yCourt Judge

